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Abstract
We show how asymmetric information and borrowersheterogene-
ity in wealth may produce equilibria in which, due to decreasing ab-
solute risk aversion, hard working poor borrowers subsidize richer bor-
rowers. In particular, a model of adverse selection and moral hazard
in a competitive credit market is developed with private information
on borrowerswealth. Because of the ambiguous e¤ect of decreasing
risk aversion on the willingness to post collateral, both separating and
pooling equilibria are possible in principle. Under separation the poor
borrowers bear the cost of separation in terms of excessive risk tak-
ing. In a more likely pooling equilibrium poor hard-working borrowers
subsidize richer ones.
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1 Introduction
Does the credit market increase inequality of opportunity among individuals?
How does the allocation of credit impact on distribution given ones wealth
and e¤ort? The "Voice of Small Business" survey1 reported in 2009 that
two thirds (61 per cent) of respondents said they have already or are con-
sidering switching banks because of their limited access to nance and lack
of appropriate nancial training and business support. A majority of small
businesses are dissatised with their banks although they still rely heavily on
them under necessity, and 1/3 of them reports specically that credit should
be allocated more fairly. All of these elements put on the alert about the role
of lending constraints and wealth gaps in a market with strongly imperfect
information.
Recent empirical evidence provides support for the importance of a bank
relationship to small poor businesses in terms of both credit availability and
credit terms such as loan interest rates and collateral. Berger and Udell
(2002) for example suggest that the accumulation over time by the loan
o¢ cer of "soft" information does play an important role to evaluate credit-
worthiness of poor business nance. Banks are also aware that success in
entrepreneurial activity is dependent on some other alternative elements as
human capital formation and it is not correlated with individualswealth
(Cressy, 1996; a, b, c). On the other side wide empirical evidence supports
the idea that capital market constraints prevent the poor from realizing en-
trepreneurial projects. In particular several studies evidence a substantial
positive correlation between wealth and the probability of becoming an en-
trepreneur, once controlled for other variables, possibly suggesting that credit
market imperfections impact negatively in particular on credit to the poor
(see for example Black, de Meza and Je¤reys, 1996; Blanchower and Oswald,
1998; Evans and Jovanovich, 1989).
With this evidence in mind, we explore the possibility that adverse selec-
tion produces perverse redistribution due to cross-subsidization in the wrong
direction. The issue of cross-subsidization has been one of the most intensely
discussed topics in the area, both in theory and practice (e.g., Black and de
Meza, 1997; de Meza and Webb, 1999, 2000; de Meza, 2002), although more
rarely it has been addressed from the equity point of view. Our contribu-
tion is grounded in the literature on ine¢ ciencies in the credit market by de
1http://www.fsb.org.uk/News.aspx?loc=pressroom&rec=5742
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Meza and Webb (1987), who point out the possibility that adverse selection
in credit markets may lead to excessive entry into entrepreneurship due to
cross subsidization, quite in contrast with the credit rationing phenomenon
emphasized by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Ine¢ cient investments may also
occur notwithstanding collateral (Bester, 1985, 1987; Besanko and Thakor,
1987) serving as a signaling device (see Coco, 2000). Most related to our
study however are the papers by Stiglitz and Weiss (1992), Coco (1999), de
Meza and Webb (1999) and Gruner (2003). The rst two papers demon-
strate the impossibility of screening by collateral in the credit market with
two classes of borrowers di¤ering for their risk attitude. Risk preferences
and project quality interact through moral hazard in conicting ways, so
that collateral is not any more a meaningful signal of project quality. In
Stiglitz and Weiss (1992) in particular, di¤erences in risk attitude arise due
to decreasing risk aversion, an idea we will exploit in this paper as well. De
Meza and Webb (1999) instead demonstrate that, even when rationing arises
in a pooling equilibrium and participation to the credit market is wealth-
dependent2, there may still be overlending due to cross subsidization. An-
other important contribution, due to Gruner (2003), shows conditions under
which intrinsically unproductive rich borrowers crowd out productive poor
ones, suggesting that an ex-ante complete redistribution of endowments may
lead to an improvement in aggregate welfare by increasing the risk-free inter-
est rate. Finally a recent contribution by Coco and Pignataro (2010) shows
that when entrepreneursheterogeneity concerns both wealth and aversion
to e¤ort, and this last variable is unobservable, wider cross subsidization in
high wealth classes may lead to a violation of the equality of opportunity
principle.
Most of these contributions duly focus their attention on the e¢ ciency
properties of equilibria. When moral hazard and adverse selection exist si-
multaneously in the credit market as in our case, then it is of interest to
determine how these two imperfections interact with di¤ering wealth endow-
ments to determine the distributional impact of credit allocation. Our model
allows for unobservable wealth with decreasing absolute risk aversion, to show
how poor individuals ending up as hard-working agents, are, in a perverted
logic, those who systematically cross subsidize rich individuals in equilib-
rium. Asymmetric information on wealth is not the customary assumption
2That is when the model displays the empirically well-established fact that wealthier
individuals are more likely to participate in the credit market.
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and it may appear strange at rst sight. However there seem to be both the
possibility and the reasons to conceal ones wealth from a bank during the
borrowing process, particularly, as in this case, when, due to decreasing risk
aversion, more wealth is a bad signal.
Specically, risk aversion and e¤ort choice interact in the determination
of the willingness to post collateral and therefore determine when the equi-
librium is pooling versus separating. Risk aversion impacts the willingness
to post collateral both directly and through e¤ort choice in opposite ways.
When the moral hazard channel is more important a separating equilibrium
is in principle possible, using collateral as screening device. The net cost
of separation is shouldered by the poor individuals in the form of excess
risk taking. When the direct e¤ect of risk aversion prevails (e.g. the sin-
gle crossing property is violated) then pooling is the only possible adverse-
selection equilibrium. This case is the most interesting one to investigate.
Cross-subsidization naturally occurs in the pooling equilibrium with the poor
hard-working borrowers subsidizing rich borrowers. The rich are therefore
charged a low rate of interest (relative to their risk) while the poor borrowers
are charged too high an interest rate. This mechanism is empirically con-
rmed by Cressy (2000) who suggests, on the basis of evidence, that wealthy
individuals due to decreasing absolute risk aversion, have a higher inclination
to take on risky assets.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the baseline
model while in Section 3 we start with characterizing the agentspreference
map. Section 4 investigates the potential equilibria in the market. Conclu-
sions follow in section 5.
2 The model
2.1 The Projects
We consider a one-period closed economy in a competitive credit market
where each project requires an amount of capital K. It yields a gross return
Y with probability of success p(e) or zero revenue in case of failure with
probability 1  p(e), where e 2 [0; e] is the amount of e¤ort and the measure
of its utility cost. Returns to e¤ort are positive and diminishing as usual, i.e.
p0(e) > 0 and p00(e) < 0. In more general terms, higher levels of e¤ort e result
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in a project whose returns rst-order stochastically dominates (FOSD) the
return of projects with lower level of e¤ort.
2.2 Entrepreneurs
There is a nite number of would-be borrowers each endowed with a project
described above. Borrowers are risk averse. Particularly, the individuals
expected utility is a concave increasing function that exhibits decreasing
absolute risk aversion, i.e., d( U 00(w)=U 0(w))=dw < 0 and U(w = 0) =  1.
Let X = (1+r)K be the total repayment where r is the interest rate required
by the bank for the amount of collateral c. Further, each agent has a di¤erent
amount of wealth wi 8i 2 [R;P ], respectively, poor and rich, which are both
insu¢ cient to full collateralization, wi < (1+ r)K. The borrowers wealth wi
and her actual e¤ort choice ei are assumed to be private information. In the
two-state case concerning our analysis, the expected utility of an individual
i is:
Ui = p(ei)U(Y  X + wi) + (1  p(ei))U(wi   c)  ei (1)
2.3 Banks
A xed amount of capital K is nanced by risk-neutral lenders. Bertrand
competition in credit market implies that in equilibrium banks earn zero ex-
pected prot and so eq. (2) below is equal to zero. Under ex-ante asymmetric
information, lenders know the wealth distribution of borrowers (a fraction 
of these entrepreneurs belongs to rich types while (1 ) are poor ones), but
cannot observe the particular borrowers wealth when a loan application is
made. We assume zero risk-free interest rate and an innitely elastic supply
of funds in the deposit market. Under these conditions the standard optimal
form of nance would be equity, but we assume that ex-post returns are un-
veriable, and therefore the only viable form of nance is debt (see de Meza
and Webb, 2000). For a single borrower, the representative banks prot in
a competitive market is:
i = p(ei)X + (1  p(ei))c K (2)
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3 Agentspreference map
If a lender can observe a borrowers level of e¤ort and can write for example
an e¤ort contingent contract, then, there is no moral hazard and a rst-
best outcomes will potentially emerge. Instead, when e¤ort is unobservable,
the bank must infer e(w;X; c), the borrowers optimal level of e¤ort as a
function of wealth and repayment of the project.
Using eq. (1), the rst order condition for the borrowers optimal choice
of e¤ort e(w;X; c) is given by:
@Ui
@ei
= p0(ei)U(Y  X + wi)  p0(ei)U(wi   c) = 1 (3)
Eq. (3) shows that the borrower supplies e¤ort until the expected value
of marginal e¤ort equals the marginal cost of e¤ort. Rearranging eq. (3), the
optimal choice of e¤ort ei (w; Y;X; c) is described by:
p0(ei ) =
1
U(Y  X + wi)  U(wi   c) (4)
From straightforward comparative statics it follows that de

dY
> 0; de

dc
>
0; de

dX
< 0; as is customary in moral hazard models. A higher repayment
negatively a¤ects the borrowers return in case of success, but not in the case
of failure, thus reducing incentives to apply more e¤ort. On the other side, a
higher amount of collateral reects higher penalty in case of failure providing
incentives to put in e¤ort.
With a similar argument, one can show that there exists a negative rela-
tion between e¤ort and wealth, i.e., the marginal e¤ort is lower, the higher
the wealth of individuals:
de
dw
< 0 (5)
Proof. See the Appendix
To explore the type of equilibria that may arise in this context, it is now
useful a diagrammatic representation of the equilibrium as follows. Using (1)
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and from the Envelope Theorem, we know that the slope of an indi¤erence
curve of a borrower in the (X; c)  space is
dX
dc
< 0 (6)
Proof. See the Appendix
The crucial element to establish the possibility of separating equilibria
is the observation of the slope of the indi¤erence curves in the (X; c) space
in relation to the wealth of borrowers. In this respect we may separate the
e¤ect of risk preferences from the impact of moral hazard. We can therefore
rewrite the slope of the indi¤erence curve in (6) as:
dX
dc
=M(w)P (w)
where M(w) =   (1 p(ei))
p(ei)
while P (w) = U
0(WF )
U 0(WS) . The curvature of the
indi¤erence curve with respect to change in wealth is then:
@
@w

dX
dc

=M(w)R0(w) +M 0(w)R(w) ? 0 (7)
Proof. See the Appendix
Here, M(w)R0(w) captures the risk preference e¤ect while M 0(w)R(w)
explains the impact of moral hazard. Not surprisingly (7) has an ambiguous
sign. On one side, the e¤ect of (decreasing) risk aversion makes the indi¤er-
ence curve atter as wealth increases. On the other side the negative impact
of moral hazard makes it steeper. Indeed, for a given project choice, due to
decreasing absolute risk aversion, rich individuals require a smaller reduction
in the repayment rate to compensate for an increase in collateral3. Whenever
the impact of moral hazard prevails as in eq. (8), rich individuals put such
a low level of e¤ort, and their probability of success diminishes by so much
that their trade-o¤ between collateral and interest rate becomes worse than
poor peoples one, notwithstanding their lower risk aversion:
3This is the case naturally proposed by Stiglitz and Weiss (1992).
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@e
@w
> p(ei)(1  p(ei))(A(W S)  A(W F )) (8)
Proof. See the Appendix
Note that this ambiguity in general means that the single crossing prop-
erty of indi¤erence curves which is a necessary condition to ensure the pos-
sibility of separation does not hold. Let us now consider the slope of the
isoprot curve for a bank lending to the borrower of class i only:
dX
dc
ji =  
(1  p(ei)) + (dp(ei)=dc) (X   c)
p(ei) + (dp(ei)=dX) (X   c) (9)
where i is the banks expected prot on the borrower of class i. Since
dp(ei)=dX is negative, (9) could in principle be positive. Note that this be-
comes more likely for high values ofX and correspondingly low values of p(ei)
and c, see Coco (1999). We may immediately note that, by construction, un-
der this information structure, individuals with a larger wealth (higher risk
from the point of view of banks) may prefer contracts that are actuarially fair
for poor individuals, e.g., on line O1 in gure 1, due to decreasing risk aver-
sion. This makes separation in pure strategies impossible when risk aversion
prevails.
4 Perverse cross-subsidization
Under hidden information lenders just know the distribution of classes of
wealth and the shares of the subgroups of the population. Figure 1 describes
the main elements of the model and the potential equilibrium which allows
the bank to break even. The indi¤erence curves for the rich and poor indi-
viduals are labeled respectively IR and IP , while the isoprot lines for rich,
pooling and poor individuals are dened as OP , OPOOLING, OR.
From eq. (7) due to decreasing absolute risk aversion, individuals with
lower wealth (and thus with greater risk aversion) may have a steeper or
atter indi¤erence curves in di¤erent portions of the (X; c) space, while
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considering eq. (5), they are also the hard-working agents at any given
contract. We will discuss in this section two polar well behavedcases arising
when (7) is always positive or always negative and the single crossing property
holds one way or the other.
In gure 1, indi¤erence curves are drawn according to the hypothesis
that the impact of risk aversion exceeds the e¤ect of moral hazard, hence
@
@w
 
dX
dc

> 0. In this case, because of decreasing absolute risk aversion and
its negative impact on e¤ort, rich individuals display a relative preference for
posting more collateral compared to the poor ones at any point in the space
(X; c) notwithstanding their lower success probabilities.
Each bank o¤ers a contract that maximizes their prot, while agents
choose the best contract among the di¤erent o¤ered alternatives. An equi-
librium is a set of contracts o¤ered by banks consistently with each other
in a competitive market. The Nash concept in pure strategies is applied,
implying that in an equilibrium, no bank is able to o¤er another contract
on which it obtains an expected return (e.g. prot) higher than the equilib-
rium one, given each entrepreneurstypes choice of contract4. Under these
conditions, separation is impossible as there exists no contract on OP that
can attract low wealth/low risk borrowers while deterring the wealthier ones.
The relative slope of the indi¤erence curves of the two types is inconsistent
with the use of collateral as a signal (as in Coco, 1999). Therefore the equi-
librium outcome is for each bank to o¤er a pooling contract, CPOOL, that
results in a competitive return when chosen by both types of borrowers and
maximizes on OPOOLING; the utility of low wealth/low risk borrowers. To
convince yourself note that any other contract on the pooling zero prot
line, OPOOLING, can be beaten by an additional contract that steals away
the good-risk borrowers and leaves it with only the worst borrowers and neg-
ative prots. Separation as we said is ruled out by the borrowerspreference
pattern. Cross-subsidization naturally occurs in the adverse selection pooling
equilibrium in pure strategies. Note moreover that contrary to other settings
(Coco, 1999), here, the pooling contract does not need to be a zero collat-
eral one (although it could). Notwithstanding the fact that borrowers are
risk averse and the bank risk neutral, posting collateral (and a lower interest
rate) increases the surplus from the project. The additional surplus accrues
entirely to borrowers and may compensate, especially for low values of col-
4That is zero prot given Bertrand Competition. See Rothshild and Stiglitz (1976) for
the denition of equilibrium in pure strategy.
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lateral where the incentive e¤ect is supposed to be larger and risk aversion
lower, the additional risk.
Lets turn now to the second case. When the moral hazard e¤ect prevails
with respect to the impact of risk aversion, the slope of the indi¤erence curve
of rich borrowers is steeper than the indi¤erence curve of poor ones. In this
case asymmetric information may in principle be overcome by the use of
collateral as a sorting device. Borrowers can be screened by the o¤er of
appropriate pair of contracts.
In this case a menu of contracts Ci = (Xi; ci) 8i 2 [R;P ] will be o¤ered
in equilibrium by the representative lender in order to maximize its expected
prot:
 = [p(eR)X + (1  p(eR))cR  K] + (10)
(1  )[p(eR)X + (1  p(eR))cR  K]
According to the revelation principle, the bank needs to restrict contract
proles ensuring that, each entrepreneur would get the contract designed for
her type (incentive compatibility) and, that the two agent types would be
willing to accept their respective contracts under individual rationality:
p(eR)U(Y  XR + wR) + (1  p(eR))U(wR   cR)  eR  (11a)
p(eR)U(Y  XP + wR) + (1  p(eR))U(wR   cP )  eR
p(eP )U(Y  XP + wP ) + (1  p(eP ))U(wP   cP )  eP  (11b)
p(eP )U(Y  XR + wP ) + (1  p(eP ))U(wP   cR)  eP
p(ei)U(Y  Xi + wi) + (1  p(ei))U(wi   ci)  ei  0 8i = R;P (12)
Of course competition results in zero prots at each contract and the
chosen contract for poor hard-working agents is the one that minimizes their
collateral, keeping incentive compatibility.
As described in gure 2, the two contracts proposed are indi¤erent for
the rich individuals, while poor ones strictly prefer CP ; given their higher
risk aversion and lower risk. Considering that each contract is on the banks
break-even line, under the further assumption that UP (CP ) > UP (CPOOL)5
5Note that under the opposite assumption the indi¤erence curve of poor borrowers
passing through CP intersects the vertical axis at a point below the break-even pooling
prot line. In this case the equilibrium does not exist because it is always possible to
design preferred pooling contracts for poor borrowers. A pooling contract however is not
equilibrium either (see Rothshild and Stiglitz, 1976).
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with the pooling contract , CPOOL, at zero collateral c = 0, thus, no other
contract (hypothetically labeled CN) can attract any bundle of the two entre-
preneurs and make a positive expected prot. Note that this requires a zero
collateral contract just for rich borrowers. In this case in which moral hazard
prevails, rich individuals put such a low level of e¤ort that their probability
of success is much lower and they prefer to pay a higher repayment in case of
success and no collateral for a probable failure. The collateral posted in CP
is the minimum amount required to avoid cross-subsidization among classes
of wealth. Of course separation occurs at a cost, a deadweight loss which, in
this case, is borne by the poor good-quality borrowers. An ine¢ cient amount
of collateral is posted in this case to signal their quality type, and a cost in
term of ine¢ cient risk allocation arises, entirely shouldered by poor good-risk
types.
Outside these two cases, the indi¤erence curves do not respect the single
crossing property and as a general rule separation is impossible. Pooling
equilibria are possible but only depending on the relative slope of the in-
di¤erence curves at the candidate zero-prot contract. In case of pooling,
cross subsidization is bound to occur just as in the rst case described above
(Figure 1). Hence outside the possible but unlikely case where conditions in
eq. (11 a; b) and (12) happen in each point on the (X; c)  space, a pooling
equilibrium is the only possible equilibrium.
5 Concluding remarks
The argument of this work is the possibility that credit market equilib-
ria entails adverse distributive e¤ects, in particular through perverse cross-
subsidization from poor to rich agents.
To this aim we build a model of the credit market where otherwise equal
borrowers, choose the e¤ort to put in a project based on the only hetero-
geneous dimension, their unobservable wealth. Because of decreasing risk
aversion, moral hazard impacts more wealthier entrepreneurs. Willingness
to post collateral here is ambiguously correlated with wealth. On one side
wealthier entrepreneurs are less risk adverse and therefore, other things equal
more willing to post collateral. On the other they are riskier because of moral
hazard and therefore less willing. When the risk aversion e¤ect is higher than
negative moral hazard one, it becomes impossible to separate borrowers in
11
equilibrium because the potential signal (collateral) is useless. In this case
cross subsidization among unobservable classes of wealth naturally occurs in
a pooling equilibrium. What strikes about this kind of equilibrium is the
direction of the cross-subsidization. Poor hard-working borrowers subsidize
rich lazyborrowers. As always, cross-subsidization implies a welfare loss
due to lower e¤ort of the good risk types because of higher than necessary
interest rates. But the overall welfare consequences of cross subsidization
relative to a separating equilibrium are unclear because on the other hand
bad risk types are beneted by lower interest rates.
Whenever the impact of moral hazard prevails in the whole contract space,
the only possible equilibrium is a separating one through the use of the
screening device. Collateral requirement in this case, is a net cost paid by
the poor individuals and, as a consequence, their net welfare will be again
lower than under full information.
In all possible cases poor borrowers lose out from asymmetric information
and the presence of rich borrowers. Asymmetric information worsens the
distribution of resources in society. Up to now, the belief that credit market
imperfections could increase inequality was widespread, but in the received
wisdom this e¤ect came through credit availability. While we believe this
channel to be relevant, we discover here a di¤erent reason to believe that
there are adverse distributional e¤ects from credit market imperfections.
These results imply that State programs promoting entrepreneurial cre-
ation need to be rened. In the last decade, a conjecture about the potential
welfare costs of exclusion has led to widespread government intervention in
the banking sector, particularly, of low income countries (Burgess, Pande
and Wong; 2005). Examples of such interventions range from interest rate
ceilings on lending to the small poor entrepreneurs to a mix of taxes (for the
infra-marginals) and subsidies (for the rationed marginals). Whether such
interventions actually improve the access of the more e¢ cient poor to banks,
help alleviate poverty and wealth gaps or both, remains widely debated.
Our research particularly conrms that such programs concentrated on spe-
cic target groups, may help unwind undesirable cross subsidization between
classes of borrowers. An appropriate design of programs requires that they
should be focused on personal characteristics of potential entrepreneurs in
the opportunity egalitarian perspectives.
A useful avenue for further research in this area is the exploration of
the interaction between subsidization and exclusion (or alternatively with
participation and entry). In our setting the equilibrium entails that all en-
12
trepreneurs are served. However in a richer setting, allowing for rationing
for example, poorer borrowers may be crowed out by richer entrepreneurs.
Or alternatively ine¢ cient entry of rich individuals can be triggered by sub-
sidization leading to an even worse outcome.
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6 The Appendix
A) Proof of eq. (5):
Starting by eq. (3):
@Ui
@ei
= p0(ei)
 
U(W S)  U(W F )  1
By the Implicit Function theorem and due to decreasing absolute risk
aversion, we simply observe that:
p00(ei)
 
U(W S)  U(W F ) de+ p0(ei)  U 0(W S)  U 0(W F ) dw = 0
p00(ei)
 
U(W S)  U(W F ) de =   p0(ei)  U 0(W S)  U 0(W F ) dw
which implies that:
de
dw
=  p
0(ei)
 
U 0(W S)  U 0(W F )
p00(ei) (U(W S)  U(W F )) < 0
B) Proof of eq. (6):
Starting by eq. (1):
Ui = p(ei)U(Y  X + wi) + (1  p(ei))U(wi   c)  ei
Let us assume that W S = Y  X + wi and W F = wi   c, we can simply
rewrite that:
Ui = p(ei)U(W
S) + (1  p(ei))U(W F )  ei
By envelope theorem and di¤erentiating with respect toX and c, it follows
that:  p(ei)U 0(W S) dX   (1  p(ei))U 0(W F ) dC = 0
 p(ei)U 0(W S) dX = (1  p(ei))U 0(W F ) dC
which implies that:
16
dX
dc
=  (1  p(ei))U
0(W F )
p(ei)U 0(W S)
= s < 0
C) Second order condition

d2X
dc2

Let us dene as s the slope of the indi¤erence curve. The curvature of the
indi¤erence curve can be studied after di¤erentiating eq. (6) with respect to
c:
d2X
dc2
=  
f [ (1 p(ei))U
00(WF ) p0(ei) @e@cU 0(WF )](p(ei)U 0(WS))
[p(ei)U 0(WS)]2
  [(1 p(ei))U
0(WF )][ p(ei)U 00(WS) @X@c +p0(ei) @e@cU 0(WS)]
[p(ei)U 0(WS)]2
g
=
=  
f  (1 p(ei))U 00(WF )
[p(ei)U 0(WS)]
  p0(ei) @e@cU 0(WF )
[p(ei)U 0(WS)]
+
p(e)(1 p(e))U 0(WF )U 00(WS) @X
@c
[p(ei)U 0(WS)]2
 p0(ei) @e@cU 0(WS)(1 p(ei))U 0(WF )
[p(ei)U 0(WS)]2
g
=
=
f (1 p(ei))U 00(WF )
p(ei)U 0(WS)
 s (1 p(ei))U 00(WS)U 0(WF )
p(ei)(U 0(WS))2
+
p0(ei) @e@cU
0(WF )
p(ei)U 0(WS)
+
p0(ei) @e@c (1 p(ei))U 0(WF )
p(ei)2U 0(WS)
g
=
=
f (1 p(ei))
p(ei)
U 0(WF )
U 0(WS)

U 00(WF )
U 0(WF )   sU
00(WS)
U 0(WS)

+
h
p0(ei) @e@cU
0(WF )
p(ei)U 0(WS)

1 + (1 p(ei))
p(ei)
i
g
=
= f s  A(W F ) + sA(W S)+p0(ei)@e@cU 0(W F )
p(ei)U 0(W S)

1
p(ei)

g=
= f s sA(W S)  A(W F )+ @e
@c
p0(ei)
(p(ei))
2
U 0(W F )
U 0(W S)

g7 0
The rst expression in curly brackets gives the negative risk aversion e¤ect
which makes more concave the indi¤erence curve while the second positive
term is the e¤ort disincentive e¤ect which renders more convex the indif-
ference curve. The former is larger, the higher the degree of risk aversion,
the more sensitive is the probability of success to the amount of collateral
provided. However to simplify in gures 1 and 2, we design the indi¤erence
curves with a negative second derivatives because convexity due the domi-
nance of the moral hazard impacts does not have signicant implications for
the existence and nature of equilibrium.
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D) Proof of eq. (7):
We can again rewrite the slope of the indi¤erence curve as:
dX
dc
=M(w)P (w)
where M(w) =   (1 p(ei))
p(ei)
while P (w) = U
0(WF )
U 0(WS) . The curvature of the
indi¤erence curve with respect to change in wealth is then:
@
@w

dX
dc

=M(w)R0(w) +M 0(w)R(w)
whereM(w)R0(w) captures the e¤ect of risk preference e¤ect whileM 0(w)R(w)
explains the moral hazard e¤ect. First, let us solve M(w)R0(w) :
M(w)R0(w) =  (1  p(ei))
p(ei)

U 00(W F )U 0(W S)  U 00(W S)U 0(W F )
(U 0(W S))2

=
=  (1  p(ei))
p(ei)

U 00(W F )
U 0(W S)
  U
00(W S)U 0(W F )
(U 0(W S))2

=
=  (1  p(ei))
p(ei)
1
U 0(W S)

U 00(W F )  U
00(W S)U 0(W F )
U 0(W S)

=
=  (1  p(ei))
p(ei)
U 0(W F )
U 0(W S)

U 00(W F )
U 0(W F )
  U
00(W S)
U 0(W S)

Let us dene A(W ) as the coe¢ cient of decreasing absolute risk aversion,
we can then rewrite M(w)R0(w) as:
M(w)R0(w) =  (1  p(ei))
p(ei)
U 0(W F )
U 0(W S)
 
A(W S)  A(W F )
=
dX
dC
 
A(W S)  A(W F ) > 0
Since W1 > W2 and considering decreasing absolute risk aversion i.e.
risk aversion decreases with wealth, A(W F ) > A
 
W S

and considering that
by construction dX
dC
is negative, we can surely say that the e¤ect of risk
preferences M(w)R0(w) is positive.
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Then we can solve M 0(w)R(w):
M 0(w)R(w) =
"
  p
0(ei) @e@wp(ei)  (1  p(ei))p0(ei) @e@w
(p(ei))
2
#
U 0(W F )
U 0(W S)
=
=
"
p0(ei) @e@w
(p(ei))
+
(1  p(ei))p0(ei) @e@w
(p(ei))
2
#
U 0(W F )
U 0(W S)
=
=
p0(ei)
p(ei)
@e
@w

1 +
(1  p(ei))
p(ei)

U 0(W F )
U 0(W S)
=
=
p0(ei)
p(ei)
@e
@w

U 0(W F )
U 0(W S)
  dX
dC

=
=  p
0(ei)
p(ei)
@e
@w

dX
dC
  U
0(W F )
U 0(W S)

< 0
Therefore,
@
@w

dX
dc

=
dX
dC
 
A(W S)  A(W F )  p0(ei)
p(ei)
@e
@w

dX
dC
  U
0(W F )
U 0(W S)

7 0
As shown, the sign of eq. (7) is uncertain due to the combination of the
positive e¤ect of risk aversion
 
dX
dC
 
A(W S)  A(W F ) and the negative
moral hazard impact  p0(ei)
p(ei)
@e
@w

dX
dC
  U 0(WF )
U 0(WS)

.
D) Proof of eq. (8):
After some algebraic manipulations,
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@@w

dX
dc

= s
 
A(W S)  A(W F )  @e
@w
p0(ei)
p(ei)

s  U
0(W F )
U 0(W S)

=
= s(1  p(ei))
 
A(W S)  A(W F )  @e
@w
p0(ei)
(1  p(ei))
p(ei)

s  U
0(W F )
U 0(W S)

=
= s(1  p(ei))
 
A(W S)  A(W F )  @e
@w
p0(ei)

(1  p(ei))
p(ei)

s+ s

=
= s(1  p(ei))
 
A(W S)  A(W F )  @e
@w
p0(ei)
s
p(ei)
= s

(1  p(ei))
 
A(W S)  A(W F )  @e
@w
1
p(ei) (U(W S)  U(W F ))

=
=
s
p(ei) (U(W S)  U(W F ))

p(ei)(1  p(ei))
 
A(W S)  A(W F )  @e
@w

The impact of moral hazard prevails if and only if:
@e
@w
> p(ei)(1  p(ei))
 
A(W S)  A(W F )
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